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For more than thirty years, until the completion of Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU), the member states of the European Union (EU) attempted to  x regional
exchange rates. Naturally enough, most explanations of this process emphasize its
monetary sources and effects. Some focus on how creating a multinational currency
area might increase the ef cacy of monetary policy. Others stress how  xing a
national currency to a low-in ation monetary anchor, or adopting a single low-
in ation currency, might enhance the anti-in ationary credibility of national mon-
etary policies.
1 In these views, European monetary integration was motivated by the
belief that, by themselves, national monetary authorities would be unable or
unwilling to pursue appropriate monetary policies.
In this article, I focus, in contrast, on what might be called real as opposed to
monetary sources and effects of European currency policies—that is, their expected
impact on cross-border trade and investment. Exchange rates regulate the relation-
ship between foreign and domestic prices, and thus the predictability and pro t-
ability of cross-border trade and investment. Rather than restrict my analysis to
monetary reasons for exchange rate policies, I suggest examining motivations that
come from the country’s trade,  nancial, and investment ties. In this view, policy-
makers weighed the costs and bene ts of  xed exchange rates with regard to their
impact on national trade and investment. The principal bene t of  xed rates and a
single currency was to facilitate intra-European trade and investment; the principal
The author acknowledges the invaluable research assistance of Kathleen O’Neill and Mark Copelo-
vitch. He also acknowledges the comments and suggestions of Alberto Alesina, S. Brock Blomberg,
William Clark, Michele Fratianni, Geoffrey Garrett, Carsten Hefeker, David Leblang, Lisa Martin,
Andrew Moravcsik, J. David Richardson, Andrew Rose, and of participants in seminars at Harvard
University, Princeton University, Syracuse University, the University of California Los Angeles, and
Washington University.
1. Another broader perspective looks at how EMU was linked to the general drive for European
integration. Accurate as this may be—for an argument in its favor see Frieden 2001—it still relies on
implicit assertions about the ultimate costs and bene ts of monetary integration. Most such assertions
focus, as do the two mentioned here, on the monetary (anti-in ationary) aspects of the process.
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foreign and home products and thus the competitive position of national producers.
The various weights that different economic interests gave to these costs and
bene ts help explain the political economy of European monetary integration.
While this real interpretation of national currency policies might be consistent with
explanations based on their monetary policy effects, it does lead to a very different
emphasis, particularly with regard to the political supporters and opponents of monetary
integration. Arguments based on anti-in ationary credibility and Optimal Currency
Areas (OCAs) emphasize economic ef ciency or very broad constituencies with
different degrees of in ation aversion; the real argument here implicates much more
speci c distributional factors. In particular, it predicts support for monetary integration
from cross-border investors and exporters of specialized manufactures who stand tolose
from currency volatility. It anticipates opposition from those, especially import com-
peters, who stand to lose from the inability of national governments to engage in
depreciations to gain international competitiveness.
The European experience provides a useful laboratory to investigate these claims.
Over three decades, European currency relations experienced a great deal of
variation. The snake and early European Monetary System (EMS) had only limited
success, while the later EMS went through a cycle of optimism, crisis, and renewed
optimism in the runup to EMU. While some countries were generally able to persist
in pegging their exchange rates to the deutsche mark (DM), others were quite
unsuccessful for long periods of time. This allows us to assess both why the fortunes
of  xed rates varied over time and why their attainment varied so much among
European countries. I suggest that the answers to these questions require prominent
consideration of the sectoral implications of currency policy’s real impact, espe-
cially how  xing the exchange rate was expected to affect both those with strong
interests in expanding inter-regional trade,  nance, and investment and those with
strong interests in limiting the impact on them of foreign competition. In this article,
I look at the statistical record of exchange rate movements in Europe from 1973
until 1995. Although it is extremely dif cult to  nd good proxies for interest-group
pressures, especially in a cross-national context, I use two measures as indicators of
private-sector concerns about the real effects of currency policy. The  rst is the level
of manufactured exports to Germany, as a proxy for the interests of internationally
engaged producers and investors who wanted to stabilize exchange rates. The
second is changes in the trade balance (controlling for the state of the current
account), which should re ect the level of concern about import and export
competition. These measures have empirically important and statistically signi cant
effects on both the rate of devaluation of national currencies against the DM and on
their volatility (two closely related policy outcomes). Countries with more manu-
factured exports to Germany were more likely to sustain a currency  xed to the DM,
consistent with the argument that exporters of complex manufactures were inter-
ested in currency stability. Periods of deterioration in the trade balance were
associated with more subsequent  oating and depreciation, consistent with the
832 International Organizationargument that dif culties in import and export markets led affected interests to
support depreciation to improve their competitive position.
Other factors also affected exchange rates. Positive macroeconomic trends—
economic growth, a payments surplus, improvements in the terms of trade—reduced
the propensity to devalue and currency volatility. There is little evidence for the
explanatory importance of purely monetary considerations, such as the need for
national anti-in ationary credibility—although admittedly the demand for credibil-
ity is extremely hard to measure. For example, countries with left-wing govern-
ments, presumably in greater need of anti-in ationary credibility, were not more
likely to  x their currencies, and  xing the exchange rate was not more likely to be
used when the country lacked an independent central bank. This is not to say that
anti-in ationary credibility was never a reason why governments  xed their ex-
change rates, only that it is dif cult to  nd evidence of its signi cance in the case
of European monetary integration. Nor is much support found for OCA factors,
speci cally the similarity of industrial structure among countries and thus their
propensity to face conditions that would call for similar monetary responses.
These results indicate that European currency policies were strongly affected by
their expected real effects, that is, their impact on trade and investment. The results
do not support—but cannot conclusively reject—monetary interpretations of Euro-
pean currency relations based on the anti-in ationary credibility-enhancing features
of a  xed exchange rate or on OCA considerations. I begin with a summary of
possible explanations of European monetary integration and how they relate to
broader political economy arguments. I then argue for the role of real factors, and
their distributional impact, in the evolution of European currency policies, and go on
to present statistical evidence relating to the argument.
European Monetary Integration: Variation and
Explanation
The ultimate success of European monetary integration has tended to obscure the
variegated history of the region’s currency policies. In fact, exchange-rate arrange-
ments in the EU have gone through many stages, and the policies of EU member
governments have varied widely. The  rst formal attempt to create a European zone
of monetary stability came as the Bretton Woods system collapsed, with the 1973
formation of the “snake in the tunnel.”
2 Within a few months, only Germany, the
Netherlands, and Belgium/Luxembourg (which shared a currency) were full partic-
ipants, with Denmark sometimes included; this remained the case until 1979. In that
2. Such expressions of intent predate the Treaty of Rome, although their relevance was limited before
the Bretton Woods system began to collapse. In this article, I call the organization in question the EU,
despite its several names in the period under review. For a less telegraphic survey of these developments,
see Frieden 1997a. For a detailed analysis, which is roughly consistent with the argument here, see
Moravcsik 1998, 238–313.
Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 833year, a new EMS and its exchange-rate mechanism (ERM) came into operation. The
EMS appeared to have added little to the snake for its  rst  ve years: only Germany
and the Benelux countries, and now more reliably Denmark, were able to keep their
currencies more or less aligned. But between 1983 and 1985, France, Italy, and
Ireland began to lock their currencies to the DM.
From 1985 until 1992, the monetary uni cation process gained momentum,
eventually attracting such improbable candidates as the United Kingdom (long
unwilling) and Spain and Portugal (long unable). The Nordic countries and Austria,
not EU members but considering joining, also tied their currencies to the EMS. In
this setting, member states began to plan for a common European currency within
a broader EMU. Progress toward this goal was interrupted in 1992–94, as tight
German monetary policy in the aftermath of German uni cation drove many EMS
members to let their exchange rates move—with at least a widening of the
acceptable target zone and at most a substantial depreciation. Momentum for EMU
was rebuilt after the currency crises faded. Eleven EU members started the  nal
steps toward a single currency in 1999, Greece joined in 2000, and these twelve
 nalized full currency union in 2002.
We can use these dimensions of variation to evaluate explanations of European
monetary integration speci cally and of currency policy more generally. Attempts to
hold to  xed exchange rates
3 were more successful at some times than at others in
Europe. In addition, EU members had highly varied experiences within the snake and
EMS. Therefore, meaningful variation occurs both over time and among countries.
The Dependent Variables
The policy choice most in need of explanation can be expressed simply: the degree
of  xity of the nominal exchange rate to the DM. This de nition of the thing to be
explained, which might be questionable in other historical and regional contexts, is
justi able in post-1973 Europe. First, exchange rate stability was a publicly stated
goal of all EU members. Second, it was clear early on that such stability implied
 xing against the DM. Third, the attention of all relevant actors—policymakers,
observers, economic agents—was on nominal exchange rates.
4
The statistical analyses use two simple measures of trends in national currency
values against the DM. The  rst is the annual rate of nominal depreciation, which
3. For simplicity, I consider the target zones of the snake and ERM equivalent to a  xed-rate system.
This raises two problems. First, target zones imply  xing within a much broader range than is usually
associated with  xed rates. However, the general policy problem is similar, especially when—as has been
the case—currencies have often reached the limits of their bands. Second, the acceptable bands were
substantially widened in the aftermath of the 1992–94 crises, so this  rst point may be less valid recently.
However, with the exception of the Irish pound, most currencies that stayed within the wider-band ERM
kept roughly inside their previous narrow band, and the Irish pound appreciated (as sterling rose), which
represents a less troubling policy problem than the more common pressure to depreciate.
4. I avoid the stronger claim that nominal and real exchange rates were tightly linked in the period,
even though there is substantial evidence for this in almost all European countries.
834 International Organizationdirectly measures the general trend of the currency against the DM anchor. (All
European currencies decline relative to the DM over the period, so there are no
appreciating currencies.) The second measure is the annual coef cient of variation
of monthly exchange rates. This gauges shorter-term volatility within each year
rather than the trend of the currency’s value.
Table 1 shows these two measures of the stability of European currencies against
the DM. The table includes the thirteen pre-EMU EU currencies other than the DM
(Luxembourg shared a currency with Belgium), plus that of Norway.
5 The table is
divided among four groups: hard-currency countries are those that were always
members of both the snake and the ERM, soft-currency countries are those that were
not reliable members of either, and intermediate countries are those that were
members of the ERM but not the snake. The four countries that were not in the EU
before 1995 (one of which, Norway, remains a nonmember) are shown separately.
The simplest way to measure the relationship between exchange rates is the rate
of change in their nominal values, in this case the average annual rate of depreci-
ation against the DM, as presented in panel A of Table 1. This has the advantage of
transparency of interpretation; however, it does not indicate potential currency
volatility. For this purpose, the coef cient of variation of national currencies against
the DM is presented in panel B of Table 1.
6 The two measures produce very similar
classi cations of countries and country-years, and when used in statistical analysis,
they give rise to virtually identical results. However, the differences are also
interesting, as they pick up (inasmuch as they differ) differences between determi-
nants of broad currency policy and of shorter-term policy toward volatility.
Explaining European Currency Policies
The varied progress and nature of European currency arrangements has attracted
much analysis. Three common explanations of European monetary integration are
relevant; they can be considered in the rough order in which they gained academic
currency.
7 The  rst set of explanations emphasized criteria associated with OCA
theory.
8 OCA theory speci es circumstances under which it is optimal for a nation
5. There might be an argument for including Iceland and Switzerland, except that neither has expressed real
commitment to European currency stability. Iceland has had relatively high and variable in ation, and
Switzerland’s international  nancial role makes purely European considerations somewhat less relevant.
6. The coef cient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean; in Table 1, currency
values are taken at monthly intervals so that the volatility being measured is monthly over the periods in
question, which are of  ve or six years. For the statistical analyses, the value is the volatility of monthly
exchange rates over each country-year. This picks up both overall declines against the DM and general
volatility, so that differences between the two dependent variables are presumably ascribable to different
determinants of volatility itself (as opposed to depreciation).
7. The European literature discussed here parallels that described in Bernhard, Broz, and Clark 2002.
8. Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963; and Kenen 1969 are early classics; Masson and Taylor 1993; and
Tavlas 1994 are more recent surveys.
Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 835TABLE 1. European currencies during the snake and the EMS
A. Average annual percentage depreciation of nominal exchange rates against the DM, select periods
1973–78 1979–83 1984–89 1990–94
Hard Currencies
Netherlands 1.14 0.77 0.01 20.13
Belgium 2.36 4.24 1.01 20.48
Denmark 4.59 4.37 1.71 0.16
Intermediate Currencies
France 6.53 5.02 2.31 0.01
Ireland 12.90 3.02 3.49 1.96
Soft Currencies
United Kingdom 12.90 0.89 6.68 2.57
Italy 17.28 5.26 4.08 6.21
Spain 12.35 6.54 3.51 5.16
Greece 13.24 13.02 18.75 10.23
Portugal 20.83 14.16 10.64 2.88
Non–EU Members
Austria 0.12 20.71 20.12 0.19
Norway 4.92 1.08 6.61 2.29
Finland 8.83 20.32 3.06 6.83
Sweden 8.41 3.83 5.35 6.18
AVERAGE 9.03 4.37 4.79 3.15
B. Coef cients of variation of nominal exchange rates against the DM
1973–78 1979–83 1984–89 1990–94
Hard Currencies
Netherlands 2.15 1.18 0.31 0.43
Belgium 2.80 9.84 1.55 1.17
Denmark 7.20 7.99 2.85 1.57
Intermediate Currencies
France 11.00 10.74 4.59 1.00
Ireland 20.47 6.75 7.02 4.83
Soft Currencies
U.K. 20.47 7.43 10.91 8.11
Italy 24.02 10.64 6.63 12.56
Spain 23.14 16.31 7.38 11.65
Greece 18.43 18.98 26.54 14.66
Portugal 35.65 21.75 17.57 7.31
Non–EU Members
Austria 1.63 1.48 0.23 0.23
Norway 8.28 4.89 11.40 5.00
Finland 14.24 5.63 6.06 16.08
Sweden 12.54 12.20 8.23 13.00
AVERAGE 14.43 9.70 7.95 6.97
836 International Organizationto give up its exchange-rate autonomy.
9 This is the case where exchange-rate policy
would otherwise be super uous, either because it would be ineffective or because it
could better be carried out by a bloc of national monetary authorities rather than
alone. High levels of factor mobility among countries make individual national
currency policies ineffective, while production structures that imply correlated
exogenous shocks make such policies unnecessary. The more mobile factors are
across countries and the more similar their susceptibility to external shocks, the
more desirable is a monetary union.
Scholars quickly concluded that this was unlikely to explain very much of
European currency policy. There was too little labor mobility among European
countries, and too little correlation among exogenous shocks, to justify the level of
interest in currency uni cation. Europe was not an OCA, and even the “hard core”
of the EMS may not have been one at the time it was established.
10 Of course, on
both dimensions there is variation among EU member states, so that some might be
more appropriate members of a currency union than others. OCA criteria may have
had differential effects on different countries that are worth considering. To assess
the degree to which OCA criteria affected currency policy, I examine the impact of
the similarity of each nation’s industrial structure to that of Germany. (The appendix
contains details on this and other measures used in this study.) This is the measure
least likely to be endogenous to currency policy; such things as factor movements
to and from Germany, another popular OCA proxy, are much more likely to be
affected by real or anticipated currency policy than national industrial structure.
A second set of arguments, motivated in part by the generally recognized failure of
the OCA approach to explain European monetary integration, focused on the possibility
that European countries pegged to the DM to “import” German anti-in ationary
credibility.
11 Various arguments have been proposed as to why a currency peg might
itself be more credible than simply committing to lower in ation.
12 Along these lines,
9. Although the theory is about currency unions, it applies—perhaps less stringently—to  xed-rate
systems. Canzoneri and Rogers 1990 discuss optimal-taxation (seignorage)-based evaluations of currency
union, but these seem unlikely to have been empirically particularly important.
10. Capital is more mobile than labor, but its relevance to adjustment is not so clear; capital controls
were very common until the late 1980s. Two representative and in uential studies are De Grauwe and
Vanhaverbeke 1993 and Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1993. Frankel and Rose 1998 present the intriguing
possibility that if “unsuitable “ countries form a currency union they might evolve to be more suited over
time, as their factor markets become more integrated and their production structures more similar.
11. See Giavazzi and Pagano 1989; and Weber 1991.
12. Most plausible are that the exchange rate is much more visible to market operators than is
monetary policy and that deviating from a peg imposes more costs on policymakers because of its impact
on both in ation and cross-border relative prices. Broz 2002 presents one version of the argument and
some evidence about its applicability. However, the logic of the argument is not fully worked out—it is
hard to see why a stated commitment to a currency target is more credible than a stated commitment to
a domestic monetary target. Indeed, Fratianni and von Hagen 1991 argue against any substantial
independent effect, but the evidence is hard to evaluate.
Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 837it is commonly argued that European exchange-rate arrangements served as a nominal
anchor for credibility-enhancing purposes.
13
Certainly this could not explain German support for monetary integration, which
is why some scholars focus on geopolitical rather than economic-policy grounds to
explain German policy.
14 It is also irrelevant to the important cases of Austria,
Belgium/Luxembourg, Denmark, and the Netherlands, all of which were low-
in ation countries that stood only to lose monetary credibility from linking their
currencies to those of high-in ation countries. But there are undoubtedly European
countries for which an attraction of the currency peg and single currency was the
link to monetary-policy credibility.
There are no good proxies for government desire for anti-in ationary credibility.
Just about anything that might increase the demand for credibility will also increase
the dif culty of attaining it. For example, the rate of in ation presumably raises both
the value of a credibility-enhancing peg and the cost of implementing one—so its
impact is likely to be indeterminate. However, the literature suggests that govern-
ments with independent central banks have less need for the potential credibility
enhancements of a  xed exchange rate. And others have argued that left-wing
governments, with a generally in ation-acceptant reputation, are particularly likely
to need the credibility a peg can provide.
15 I thus assess the credibility argument,
quite imperfectly, by seeing whether  xed rates are associated with the absence of
central bank independence, or with leftist governments.
More recently, an alternative (or perhaps a supplement) to these monetary
policy–based approaches has arisen, emphasizing the real effects of currency
stability and currency union on cross-border trade and investment. Many scholars
had been skeptical of such effects, as the prevailing wisdom held that deep forward
and futures markets made currency volatility a trivial matter. But more recent
research has found that reducing currency  uctuations, and especially sharing
currencies, has a very substantial impact on cross-border trade. One controversial
study found that currency uni cation tripled trade among union members.
16 This has
refocused attention on the ways in which currency policies can affect the environ-
ment for international trade and investment. By extension, it reinforces the plausi-
bility of explanations of currency policy that focus on its impact on a country’s trade
and  nancial ties.
The argument made here builds on this third body of thought, emphasizing the
real effects of currency policy and thus its impact on trade and investment. The
effects of most importance to policy choice are of two sorts. First, just as currency
13. Milesi-Ferretti 1995, however, discusses how policymakers may have partisan electoral incentives
not to tie their hands, inasmuch as precommitment strategies might reduce the electoral disadvantages of
potential opponents. If, for example, Left parties have a bad in ationary reputation, anything that reduces
a government’s ability to in ate reduces the electoral disadvantage of the Left.
14. Garrett 2001.
15. On central bank independence, Broz 2002 is a good example; on Left governments, see Simmons
1994.
16. Rose 2000.
838 International Organizationvolatility increases the riskiness of cross-border transactions, exchange-rate stability
reduces uncertainty about a price of great importance to those involved in cross-
border economic activity. Second, currency movements affect the relative prices of
home and foreign goods and services, and currency  exibility allows policymakers
to vary the exchange rate, especially to devalue and make domestic products cheaper
relative to foreign goods.
17 Policymakers thus face a trade-off between exchange-
rate  exibility and exchange rate stability, and political economy factors—espe-
cially the relative importance of groups in society who stand to gain from one or the
other side of the trade-off—have a powerful impact on their ultimate choice.
18
The trade-off between exchange-rate stability and the freedom to vary the
currency’s value tends to pit two broad groups against one another, based on how
highly they value the two con icting goals. Both import-competing and exporting
 rms are helped by depreciation. For this reason, I expect opposition to  xing
exchange rates to come especially from import-competing and exporting sectors.
Conversely, the less threatening import- and export-market competition is to
national producers, the less likely they are to oppose  xing the exchange rate.
On the other hand, exchange-rate volatility principally affects those with sub-
stantial cross-border contractual interests. Foreign investors, lenders, and borrowers
dislike the unpredictability associated with substantial  uctuations in currency
values, which are often not amenable to hedging at longer time horizons. In addition,
volatility typically harms exporters of goods with limited pass-through, that is,
goods whose prices to consumers do not fully re ect exchange-rate movements,
usually due to substantial product differentiation.
19 I expect those with cross-border
economic interests to have been more oriented toward  xing the value of the
national currency.
20
17. Although governments cannot affect the real (in ation-adjusted) exchange rate at will, available
evidence is strong that policy can have a powerful impact over the medium run, usually estimated as four
to seven years. For surveys, see Frankel and Rose 1995; and Rogoff 1996.
18. The argument here is closely related to that made in Frieden and Stein 2001 and tested in the Latin
American context in Frieden, Ghezzi, and Stein 2001. It is consistent with the long-term neutrality of
money and the ef ciency of forward markets: short- and medium-term factors are politically relevant, and
forward markets are limited in their ability to protect economic agents far into the future.
19. Pass-through refers to the extent to which movements in exchange rates are re ected in product
prices. Some goods, especially highly standardized ones sold in highly competitive markets (for example,
wheat, textiles), re ect exchange-rate changes immediately. Producers of other sorts of goods, especially
more specialized and differentiated products in which quality, service, and customer loyalty—things
related to market share—matter, are more reluctant to vary prices. This has been observed in such goods
as transport equipment (think of the non-responsiveness of the prices of Japanese cars in the United States
to the dollar-yen exchange rate), commercial aircraft, and machine tools. Goldberg and Knetter 1997 is
an excellent survey.
20. I recognize that there are somewhat heroic assumptions underlying these assertions and do not
defend them here. Certainly currency volatility is less costly when it is mean-reverting, and forward
contracts are valuable; uncertainty is simply a part of doing business, some  rms make money on
currency  uctuations, and limited pass-through cuts both ways (to mention a few of the most common
objections). However, relatively simple models with some price stickiness can easily provide the results
I assert. In any case, whether these effects are present, and are politically relevant, is an empirical
question—one that I attempt to assess here.
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trade-off: manufactured exporters. In general, exporters favor maintaining the
exchange rate as an active policy instrument. The exporters and import competers
most sensitive to nominal exchange rate levels are those whose product prices are
more or less fully passed through, typically standardized products such as commod-
ities, clothing, footwear, and steel. But the impact of the level of the exchange rate
is mitigated in the case of industries with little pass-through; an appreciation does
not cause an analogous rise in the (foreign-currency) price of exports, nor does a
depreciation signi cantly increase (domestic-currency) export prices. In these in-
stances, the exchange risk is carried by the export-producer, so that currency
volatility can be quite costly. A common example is that of automobiles, which are
priced to local market conditions. If the yen appreciates against the DM, studies  nd,
Japanese car exporters hold their German prices steady, out of fear that price
increases would lose them market share. For this reason, exporters of specialized,
product-differentiated manufactured goods—typically the most important European
exporters—are less likely to want a weak exchange rate and more likely to value
currency stability.
To summarize, I expect division between economic actors who support and
oppose  xed rates for real rather than monetary reasons. Cross-border investors and
 nancial actors, as well as export-competing producers of specialized manufactured
goods, will be in favor of  xed rates. Producers of standardized import-competing
and export goods—those in favor of maintaining the national ability to depreciate
the currency—will be against  xed rates. This re ects the trade-off mentioned
before, between stability and a predictable currency value, on the one hand, and the
 exibility to alter currency values to facilitate competition with foreigners, on the
other.
Of course, much nuance and complexity is still masked. There are  rms for which
the trade-off between reduced currency volatility and the loss of exchange rate
autonomy is not clear, either because both are important or because neither is
important. I also have (mostly for brevity’s sake) ignored the interests of nontrad-
able producers, such as public sector employees and small businesses, which
typically favor maintaining monetary policy autonomy rather than sacri cing it to
stabilize currency values that have little direct impact on them.
The principal argument of this study, then, is that exchange-rate policy has
enough prominent real economic and distributional effects to matter politically.
Speci cally, principal supporters of  xing European exchange rates were  rms and
industries with major cross-border investments, markets, or other business interests;
principal opponents were producers of standardized import-competing and export
products. In national political debates, this sometimes took the form of allegations
that monetary integration was a tool of big business, or that opposition to monetary
integration came from more backward and uncompetitive sectors. I expect the
support of the former for  xing exchange rates to be relatively constant, while the
opposition of the latter should increase at times of a real appreciation and associated
840 International Organizationcompetitive dif culties for national producers.
21 This distributional aspect of Eu-
ropean currency politics has been absent in most analyses of European monetary
integration, and contrasts with the general focus on the anti-in ationary effects of
the thirty-year process of currency uni cation.
22
My focus on special-interest considerations is not meant to deny the potential
importance of other factors, but rather to redress an imbalance in the literature.
While special interests are a natural starting point for most economic policy
analyses, this has not been the case for exchange-rate policy. In fact, many analysts
are skeptical of the view that there are constituencies for and against currency
policy. Prominent macroeconomists believe that the distributional effects of cur-
rency regimes are unclear, small, or both, while many political scientists believe that
substantial collective action problems preclude serious politicking over currency
values.
23 Both positions are open to challenge. Economically, almost every attempt
to  x exchange rates involves substantial real appreciations, with equally substantial
distributional implications. Even in the steady state, it is not obvious that volatility
is distributionally neutral, both in general and with regard to exchange rates; at the
very least, clear evidence for this hypothesis is still lacking.
24 Politically, the
extraordinary political prominence of exchange rates in history and today seems to
call the assertion into question. From the 1860s until the 1930s, the gold standard
was a major, and mass, political issue in most countries; since 1980, exchange rates
have been domestic “high politics” in many developed and developing countries as
well.
25
The Principal Explanatory Variables
Attempts to evaluate arguments based on the distributional effects of exchange-rate
policies are hampered by the general unobservability of special-interest politics. In
this article, I use two variables that can be interpreted as affecting policy by way of
21. Again, all this leaves out much detail. One of the more interesting features of the runup to EMU
was that import competers in the likely core increasingly came to insist on including the periphery—
especially Italy and Spain—to eliminate the possibility of such “competitive depreciations” as those of
1992–4. Perhaps most striking in this regard is the position of import-competing French industries, which
went from opponents of the EMS in the early 1980s to strong suppporters of a broad EMU by the mid
1990s. In the former period, EMS membership ruled out a French devaluation and led to a real
appreciation; in the latter period, Italian and Spanish non-membership in EMU would have allowed them
to depreciate against the franc, again causing a real appreciation of the French currency. The result was
that potentially affected  rms switched from opposition to French membership in the EMS to strong
support for the inclusion of the entire EU in EMU.
22. For some exceptions, see the essays in Jones, Frieden, and Torres 1998; Pisani-Ferry, Hefeker, and
Hallett 1997; and Hefeker 1997.
23. See Giovannini 1993 for an example of the former; and Gowa 1988 for a classic statement of the
latter.
24. An interesting perspective on the potential costs—including distributional effects—of volatility is
Inter-American Development Bank 1995. For arguments that currency volatility does matter, see Hefeker
1997; and Neumeyer 1998.
25. Frieden 1994 and 1997b discuss the issue in a historical and contemporary perspective.
Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 841their differentiated and distributionally relevant effects on particular groups. The
 rst attempts to pick up the interests of manufacturers with signi cant intra-
European export interests; the second tries to capture the interests of those facing
signi cant import and export competition. Neither is unproblematic, but there are no
readily available superior alternatives. The two variables are as follows.
1. Exports to the German currency bloc. As discussed above, I expect that
producers of specialized manufactured products will seek to keep exchange
rates stable. Of course, this is countered by concern for the level of the real
exchange rate. Keeping this in mind, manufacturers where pricing to market
is common tend to oppose currency volatility. This should be of special
importance in European monetary politics to the extent that manufactured
exports to Germany are signi cant. Here I use exports to the DM bloc, de-
 ned as Germany plus Benelux. The higher the share of manufactured ex-
ports to the DM zone as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), the more
support I expect for stabilizing the currency with the DM. The use of the
DM bloc as the relevant region is unimportant: overall manufactured ex-
ports to Germany alone, or to the broad EU, as a share of GDP are highly
correlated with this, and their use yields nearly identical results. The vari-
able name I use for this is MANUFACTURED EXPORTS TO DM ZONE AS PERCENT-
AGE OF GDP, and I expect the sign to be negative. (A negative sign implies
that a higher value of the variable is associated with less devaluation and
less volatility. The appendix describes all variables in detail.)
2. Import competition. On the other hand, some of the most signi cant pres-
sures to depreciate (or not to join the snake or ERM) came from producers
that stood to lose from their government’s foregoing the ability to change
the exchange rate to affect competitiveness. Although there is no ready way
to measure concern about competitive pressures, one reasonable proxy is
the rate of change in import and export competition. That is, where a coun-
try’s producers are experiencing a surge in imports or a drop in exports,
they are more likely to be interested in a depreciation and less supportive
of  xing the exchange rate. This implies that a deterioration in the trade
balance should increase support for depreciation and reduce support for a
 xed rate. This is analogous to the common observation that increased im-
port competition tends to increase protectionist pressures from affected in-
dustries.
26
In using this measure, I control for the state of the current account for
important reasons. It would not be surprising if large current account de -
26. It has analogous weaknesses. In fact, if producers can gain from a depreciation, or from trade
protection, they should support these no matter how much import competition they face (even in the
absence of import competition). Nonetheless, the virtually universal observation is that support for
protection/depreciation is strongly affected by import competition. A variety of explanations for this have
been proposed, but serious consideration of these is well beyond the scope of this article.
842 International Organizationcits were associated with depreciations, for they put direct currency-market
pressure on the exchange rate. However, what I use here is the impact of
changes in the trade balance controlling for the state of the current account.
This measure can only plausibly be picking up particular sensitivity to trade
relations, the state of imports and exports. This variable is not simply the
economic impact of a trade de cit: a trade de cit that does not lead to a
current account de cit does not put pressure on the currency in foreign ex-
change markets. It thus seems reasonable to regard it as an indicator of the
position of national import-competers and export-competers.
27 The greater
the deterioration in the trade balance (again, controlling for the current ac-
count balance), the greater the pressures to depreciate. Here I use the
change from the previous year in the trade balance as a share of GDP, so
that a positive (negative) number is an improvement (deterioration). The
variable name I use for this is CHANGE IN TRADE BALANCE AS PERCENT OF
GDP, and I expect the sign to be negative.
The two proxies for private interests I use here are not as close as we might like
to what we want to measure, the lobbying behavior of private interests. Nor do they
cover all the private interests I argue should matter, especially those of cross-border
investors. Better proxies, however, are dif cult to identify, let alone obtain data on.
The extent of intra-European trade is probably a reasonable approximation of the
importance of stabilizing exchange rates for traders and export-oriented producers.
But this ignores the interests of cross-border  nancial and investing interests—for
the simple reason that data on them are essentially unavailable. One might imagine
that foreign direct investment (FDI) among European countries would be easy to
obtain. Unfortunately, this measure is only available for a few countries before the
early 1980s, and even then with much error. When the statistical analysis is
performed with FDI data, more than half of the observations have to be omitted, and
the omitted countries are biased toward Southern Europe. It is thus not clear that
these results (which are not reported here but which tend to be similar to those for
manufactured exports) are valid. The FDI measures are in any case correlated
(correlation coef cient of 0.54) with the manufactured export  gures. It is, by the
same token, extremely dif cult to come up with reasonable proxies for private-
sector concern about the ability to use the exchange rate to affect competitiveness.
The strategy used here—to look at increased net imports as an indicator of how
much competition producers face—has many  aws, but seems better than available
alternatives. All in all, the two measures used are plausible, if imperfect, indicators
27. Of course, the trade balance also picks up exports, and this is also a measure of pressures from
exporters for a “competitive depreciation.” In a sense, the inclusion of overall levels of exports in the
previous measure and consideration of changes in net imports in this measure provide a contrast between
a structural or secular trend in manufactured exports, on the one hand, and year-to-year surges in net
imports on the other. It seems legitimate to presume, at least as a  rst cut, that these are reasonable
proxies for specialized exporting and import/export-competing interests, respectively.
Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 843of important private sector interests in currency policy. In the absence of other
suitable indicators, they constitute a reasonable  rst cut.
Alternative Explanatory Variables. As mentioned above, the principal alterna-
tive perspective emphasizes currency pegs as anti-in ationary commitment mech-
anisms; some attention is still paid to OCA theory. The variables I use to evaluate
these arguments are as follows.
1. Credibility concerns. It is hard to imagine any clean measure of the demand
for anti-in ationary credibility. Of course, high in ation implies a greater
need for credibility, but it also implies a higher cost of achieving it. In ad-
dition, high in ation leads directly to currency depreciation when the au-
thorities are not using the exchange rate as an anti-in ationary commitment
device, which invalidates any simple expectation that high in ation should
be generally associated with currency stability. Ideally, we would like a
measure that re ects government need for, or use of, currency policy for
credibility purposes; there is no simple way of assessing this. Here I use a
series of measures all of which could plausibly be associated with govern-
ment desires to enhance anti-in ationary credibility. None is a direct mea-
sure of the demand for credibility, but all are potentially related to it.
A. Central bank independence. Inasmuch as the independence of the cen-
tral bank is associated with lower in ation, this should reduce the gov-
ernment’s need for the anti-in ationary credibility that a currency peg is
purported to provide, and thus reduce the likelihood of such a currency
link. A more dependent central bank, on the other hand, should increase
the demand for credibility and thus the likelihood of a currency peg.
The measure used is the standard one created by a group of scholars in
an in uential study.
28 Variable name (expected sign): CENTRAL BANK IN-
DEPENDENCE (1).
B. Partisan effects. To the extent that the Left is more in ation prone than
the Right, we expect the Left to have a greater need for the sort of com-
mitment technology that a currency link is expected to provide. So, the
further Left a government, the more likely it is to choose the DM cur-
rency peg. The variable used here measures the partisan (Left-Right)
nature of the cabinet in power; parties are coded on a widely accepted
scale and weighted according to their importance in the cabinet. On this
scale, lower numbers are more to the Left. (Alternate measures of the
legislative center of gravity, or the government’s ideology, which use
similar scales, yield nearly identical results.) Variable name (expected
sign): CABINET CENTER OF GRAVITY (1).
28. Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992.
844 International OrganizationC. Government instability. It is a commonplace of macroeconomic political
economy that less stable and/or more fragmented governments are par-
ticularly in need of monetary-policy credibility. So the more unstable
and fragmented are governments, the more likely they should be to
choose the DM link. I use two measures that are not closely related in
institutional terms. The  rst is the share of all legislative seats held by
the governing coalition, which indicates roughly the security of the gov-
ernment in of ce (a measure that uses share of all votes gives the same
results). The bigger this seat share, the more stable the government, the
less likely it is to need the currency as a commitment mechanism, and
the less likely is a peg. The second measure is the number of parties in
government, which gives a rough sense of the government’s stability;
more parties in government should increase the need for credibility and
thus the propensity to link to the DM.
29 Variable names (expected
signs): PERCENTAGE OF SEATS HELD BY GOVERNMENT PARTIES, NUMBER OF
GOVERNMENT PARTIES (1, 2).
None of these variables is, as noted, a direct measure of the demand for
credibility. There is almost certainly no such direct measure, however, and all of the
variables employed here have been used to evaluate credibility-based arguments in
other studies. They are plausible proxies for a government’s desire to use exchange-
rate policy for anti-in ationary credibility purposes.
2. Similarity of economic structure. In the OCA framework, the more similar
national economies are, the less they need independent monetary policies.
Here I use the correlation of a nation’s industrial structure with that of Ger-
many, which should indicate how different the exogenous shocks affecting
the two countries are likely to be. Other related measures might be used.
The correlation of a nation’s trade structure with that of Germany has at-
tractions (as it is more directly related to pressures on the exchange rate),
but it risks endogeneity, as trade structure is much more likely to be af-
fected by exchange-rate policy than overall industrial structure. In any case,
the two measures are highly correlated and give nearly identical results.
Other measures of OCA criteria tend to give rise to very similar categoriza-
tions of countries.
30 In the case of the measure of industrial structure, the
greater the correlation with Germany, the more likely the country is, by
OCA criteria, to maintain a  xed exchange rate with the DM. Variable
name (expected sign): INDUSTRIAL CORRELATION WITH GERMANY (2).
29. As any political scientist knows, this last measure has major problems. The number of parties in
government is the direct result of the electoral system and will generally increase with proportionality or
district magnitude. Inasmuch as we know that small open economies are generally much more likely to
have the “purest” proportional representation schemes, this measure may well be closely related to
openness. In fact, the correlation between the number of parties in government and manufactured exports
to the EU as a share of GDP is .18; the relationship is present but not particularly strong.
30. For example, Gros 1996.
Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 845Control Variables. It is important to control for other factors that could be
expected to affect exchange-rate movements. Macroeconomic conditions are fore-
most among these factors. I include these, and a couple of other common explana-
tions of currency movements, as controls.
1. Macroeconomic conditions: Developments in national macroeconomic per-
formance affect the propensity of a currency to depreciate. While the argu-
ments for depreciation in each of these instances are problematic, generally
speaking, particularly dif cult years should be associated with a weaker
currency.
A. Growth rates. Recessions may increase the propensity of monetary au-
thorities to use depreciation to stimulate the economy. This depends on
the trade-off between the income and substitution effects of a deprecia-
tion, but the consensus is that depreciations can be stimulative in the
short run. Variable name (expected sign): LAGGED GROWTH RATE OF GDP
(2) (that is, the stronger GDP growth, the less depreciation).
B. Unemployment. This can be expected to be signi cant for the same rea-
son as the overall rate of economic growth. Variable name (expected
sign): LAGGED UNEMPLOYMENT (1).
C. The current account. The weaker a country’s current account, the more
downward pressure there will be on its currency and the likelier a de-
preciation. Note that this is the more or less purely economic effect
mentioned above, for which I control to assess the independent impact
of trends in imports and exports. Variable name (expected sign): LAGGED
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP (2).
D. The terms of trade. The difference between movements in the country’s
terms of trade and those of Germany should affect the currency. The
more the country’s terms of trade deteriorate relative to Germany, the
harder it should be to sustain a  xed exchange rate. A positive number
here means that the terms of trade improved in the year relative to Ger-
many’s, while a negative number means they deteriorated. This implies
that increases in the measure should make it easier to sustain the cur-
rency peg, and vice versa. Variable name (expected sign): DIFFERENCE IN
TERMS OF TRADE RELATIVE TO GERMANY (2).
As can be seen from the variable names, all these are lagged one year except for
the terms of trade  gure. This is because policy can be expected to respond to such
macroeconomic trends only with something of a delay, except for the terms of trade,
which is a price-based measure and thus should have nearly immediate effect. In any
case, using simultaneous (lagged, in the case of the terms of trade) data makes no
difference to the results. The current account is expressed as a percentage of GDP,
unemployment is a share of the labor force, GDP growth is a rate of (real) change,
846 International Organizationand the terms of trade are also a rate of change; all are expressed in percentage
points.
2. Other controls: I include three other control variables, as they are com-
monly mentioned in the literature.
A. Membership in the snake or EMS. Of course, this is endogenous, but
many believe that the snake and EMS, as international (regional) institu-
tions, may have had a substantial independent impact on government
behavior. This is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country
was a member of one of the two exchange rate mechanisms and zero
otherwise. Variable name (expected sign): MEMBER OF SNAKE OR ERM
(2).
B. Election timing. In the spirit of the political business cycle, governments
may be expected to manipulate the currency in the runup to an election.
What in fact they do depends on the relative desirability of the stimula-
tive effect of depreciation and the income effect of an appreciation.
However, the traditional view of in ation and depreciation as similar in
source and effect would lead us to expect elections to be associated with
depreciations. The measure here is simply whether an election occurred
in the year in question; the measure has its problems but is adequate for
present purposes. Variable name (expected sign): ELECTION (1).
C. Capital controls. Controls on capital movements should facilitate the
maintenance of a  xed exchange rate. Of course, countries whose ex-
change rates face market skepticism for other reasons—such as macro-
economic fundamentals or political instability—are more likely to im-
pose capital controls in the  rst place, so it may not be clear what to
expect. However, in general it seems reasonable to expect countries with
capital controls to be less likely to depreciate, all else being equal. The
measure used is a composite created by Dennis Quinn and drawn from
the International Monetary Fund’s categorization of restrictions on capi-
tal movements. Variable name (expected sign): CAPITAL CONTROLS (2).
Table 2 presents simple descriptive statistics, showing the evolution of the means
of all dependent and explanatory variables over the course of the period, divided into
four subperiods (snake, early EMS, late EMS, and EMU). Table 3 presents a
correlation matrix, which demonstrates several key points. First, the two dependent
variables are very closely related (0.82 correlation). Second, several alternate
measures of similar factors are closely related—for example, exports to the DM
zone are highly correlated (0.91) with exports to the EU more broadly. Third, where
available, the correlation between FDI and exports among the same countries is
relatively high (0.50 to 0.53). Fourth, there are very few correlations of note among
explanatory variables—none above 0.5—and most substantially below that. This is
of particular importance because it would be reasonable to worry about the
Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 847collinearity of many of the macroeconomic and monetary variables. It is reassuring
to know that these problems are minimal.
Analyzing European Monetary Politics: A Statistical Assessment
The following statistical analysis uses the two measures in Table 1 as dependent
variables. The annual depreciation rate is a better indicator of broad trends of currency
policy; the volatility measurepicksup both overall depreciations and intra-year currency
 uctuations. Although the two are strongly correlated and yield similar results, where
results differ is interesting in itself, as I discuss in the following section. I look at all
current EU members except Germany, the anchor country, and Luxembourg, which
shared a currency with Belgium. I also include Norway, as it often attempted tostabilize
its currency against the DM, and there would have been little ex ante justi cation for
excluding it at the outset of the sample. The period runs from the beginning of 1973 to
the end of 1994, with annual observations. I stop the analysis in 1995 because at that
point the EU was clearly in the runup to EMU, whose dynamic was quite different from
that of the attempts to  x exchange rates that had come before. The explanatory
variables are as described previously and in more detail in the appendix. The regressions
TABLE 2. Averages of all variables for all countries across periods
1973–1978 1979–1983 1984–1989 1990–1994
AVERAGE DEPRECIATIONVS . DM 9.034 4.963 4.227 3.147
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATIONVS . DM .033 .027 .019 .019
INDUSTRIAL CORRELATION .723 .745 .750 .685
LAGGED GDP GROWTH 3.671 2.240 2.731 1.651
LAGGED UNEMPLOYMENT (AS % OF LABOR FORCE) 3.969 6.681 9.170 8.810
LAGGED CURRENT ACCOUNT AS A % OF GDP 21.917 22.446 2.762 2.196
DIFFERENCE IN TERMS OF TRADE .198 1.833 2.820 .078
MEMBERSHIP OF SNAKE OR ERM .356 .420 .435 .536
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
(0–1, 1 MOST INDEPENDENT)
.340 .344 .345 .345
CAPITAL CONTROLS 6.030 5.150 4.244 2.207
(0–15, 15 MOST CONTROLS)
CABINET CENTER OF GRAVITY
(1–5, 5 MOST RIGHT WING)
2.788 2.934 3.017 2.873
ELECTION .286 .357 .298 .271
NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT PARTIES 2.035 1.832 2.100 2.255
PERCENT OF SEATS HELD BY GOVERNMENT PARTIES 47.628 48.546 49.578 53.252
MANUFACTURING EXPORTS TO DM ZONE AS A % OF
GDP
3.479 3.801 4.504 5.063
MANUFACTURING EXPORTS TO EC AS A % OF GDP 9.155 9.771 11.649 12.042
TRADE BALANCE CHANGE AS A SHARE OF GDP
(LAGGED)
.039 .153 .142 .548
848 International Organizationusing these panel data are all corrected for serial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity,
and panel-corrected standard errors are presented.
31
Tables 4 and 5 present the results. The  rst column of each table presents the full
model including all the variables. The second model reanalyzes the data, dropping
the explanatory variables that do not come close to statistical signi cance. In the
third model, variables from the second model that now fail to reach statistical
signi cance are dropped.
The results are quite stable across speci cations, as are the coef cients. Starting
with Table 4, in which the left-hand-side variable is the annual depreciation rate, six
explanatory variables are signi cant in all three models; only two other variables
even come close to reaching signi cance in one or two speci cations.
The three principal macroeconomic control variables are clearly important. The
state of the current account, GDP growth, and the terms of trade (relative to
Germany’s) all have the expected signs and clearly had a powerful impact on
exchange rates.
The proxies for the importance of real—rather than monetary—factors and of
private interests are statistically signi cant and in the expected direction. First, the
larger the country’s manufactured exports to the DM zone as a share of GDP, the
less likely it was to depreciate. Countries more commercially integrated with
Germany were more likely to  x their currencies against that of Germany. This
 nding is consistent with the idea that export-oriented manufacturers, and multina-
tional  rms whose interests tend to track those of manufactured exporters, value
currency stability. Second, deterioration in the trade balance (controlling for the
current account balance), such as would be caused by an import surge, is strongly
associated with depreciation. The more net import competition a country faced, the
less likely the country was to  x its currency against the DM. This  nding is
consistent with the idea that the import- and export-competers faced with increased
foreign competition pressed for a depreciation and, more generally, with the
argument that currency policy was made with real considerations—its impact on
trade and investment—strongly in mind.
The proxies used here to attempt to capture anti-in ationary credibility or OCA
motivations for currency pegs were not signi cant in any speci cation. None of the
measures associated with credibility concerns had any impact on the propensity to
hold to a currency peg: neither the partisan composition of government, the two
measures of general government strength or stability (the government’s share of all
seats and the number of parties in government), nor central bank independence had
any impact. The correlation of national industrial structures with Germany’s, the
proxy for OCA status, is not signi cant.
The other factors considered yielded mixed results at best. Although there is some
evidence that membership in the snake or ERM was associated with more stability
31. Data analysis was carried out on Stata 5.0 using the corrections for serial autocorrelation and panel
heteroskedasticity (based on Beck and Katz) included in the Stata package.
Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 849against the DM, as expected, this variable does not reach statistical signi cance.
32
There is little support for the notion that governments were more prone to depreciate
in election years, as the results are not statistically signi cant. One variable is clearly
signi cant but in the opposite direction to that usually expected. Capital controls, far
from helping sustain the exchange rate against the DM, are associated with more
depreciation. There is a clear problem of simultaneity here, though, as countries
facing attacks on their currencies are more likely to impose capital controls.
32. However, the snake/ERM variable is mildly correlated (0.39) with manufactured exports so that
there may be some collinearity problems.
TABLE 3. Correlations among principal variables
DEPRECIATE COV GDPGROWTH UNEMPLOY CURRACCT DIFFTOFT INDUSTCORR
SNAKE/
EMS CABINETCG
DEPRECIATE 1.00
COV 0.82 1.00
GDPGROWTH 20.19 20.15 1.00
UNEMPLOY 20.08 20.15 20.02 1.00
CURRACCT 20.20 20.21 0.11 20.00 1.00
DIFFTOFT 20.37 20.22 0.13 20.04 20.04 1.00
INDUSTCORR 20.20 20.30 20.00 0.43 0.16 20.08 1.00
SNAKE/EMS 20.15 20.40 20.00 0.47 0.02 20.04 0.47 1.00
CABINETCG 0.07 0.06 20.07 0.38 20.11 20.08 0.14 0.21 1.00
ELECTION0.06 0.03 20.02 0.03 20.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04
GOVSEATS 0.03 20.04 0.10 0.07 0.04 20.06 0.02 20.01 0.05
GOVPARTIES 20.09 20.08 20.01 20.04 20.04 20.01 20.01 0.16 20.04
CBI 0.06 20.12 20.01 20.11 20.18 20.09 20.12 20.05 0.07
CAPCTRLS 0.33 0.26 0.09 20.17 20.35 0.03 20.37 20.22 20.11
MFGEXP-DM 20.21 20.39 20.04 0.09 0.21 20.10 0.48 0.38 20.03
MFGEXP-EC 20.20 20.33 20.01 0.17 0.05 20.08 0.42 0.39 20.00
FDI-DM 20.22 20.32 0.03 0.08 0.40 20.03 0.36 0.40 20.02
FDI-EC 20.17 20.26 0.06 0.21 0.30 20.02 0.27 0.43 0.07
TRBALCHG 20.18 20.22 20.38 0.09 20.41 0.17 20.01 0.15 0.08
INFLATION 0.23 0.28 20.14 0.08 20.35 0.04 0.03 20.05 0.08
850 International OrganizationTable 5 presents results of the same sort of regression analysis, using the
coef cient of variation of the nominal exchange rate as the dependent variable.
33
Results for the private-interest variables and macroeconomic controls are essentially
as before: more manufactured exports to the DM zone, improvements in the trade
balance, faster GDP growth, and a stronger current account are all associated with
reduced volatility. Evolution in the terms of trade is signi cant in only one
speci cation. Most other variables are as before: elections and government strength
and stability are insigni cant, and capital controls is signi cant in a direction
opposite to that expected. So far the results are essentially the same as in the
previous speci cation.
33. In the regression, unlike in Table 1, the relevant period is a year; this is the standard deviation of
a currency’s value (measured monthly) over its annual mean value.
ELECTION GOVSEATS GOVPARTIES CBI CAPCTRLS
MFGEXP-
DM
MFGEXP-
EC FDI-DM FDI-EC TRBALCHG INFLATION
1.00
20.07 1.00
0.02 0.28 1.00
0.04 20.02 20.11 1.00
20.02 0.06 20.16 0.04 1.00
0.04 0.23 0.05 0.03 20.21 1.00
0.06 0.13 0.12 20.08 20.14 0.91 1.00
20.03 0.24 20.13 20.11 20.46 0.53 0.37 1.00
20.00 0.28 0.02 20.11 20.45 0.56 0.50 0.83 1.00
0.01 20.14 0.00 20.00 0.01 0.10 0.22 20.04 0.05 1.00
20.04 20.21 20.12 20.22 0.41 20.40 20.27 20.51 20.43 0.16 1.00
Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 851There are three differences between these results and those having to do with the
depreciation rate; these differences have mixed implications for credibility-related
perspectives. The partisan composition of government has an effect in the way
generally anticipated by credibility-based arguments: the more left-wing the gov-
ernment, the less volatile the currency. But central bank independence does not: it
is associated with less short-term volatility. In addition, snake/EMS membership is
also associated with less volatility. The results imply therefore that these three
factors are not strong enough to affect longer-term trends in currency values—the
depreciation rate—but that they do reduce currency volatility. Left-wing govern-
TABLE 4. Determinants of European depreciation rates.
Dependent variable 5 depreciation rate
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 3.660
(3.703)
3.305**
(1.409)
3.633**
(1.372)
LAGGED GROWTH RATE OF GDP 20.742**
(0.208)
20.647**
(0.203)
20.672**
(0.203)
LAGGED UNEMPLOYMENT 0.029
(0.111)
——
LAGGED CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP
20.258
(0.177)
20.393**
(0.180)
20.394**
(0.179)
DIFFERENCE IN THE TERMS OF TRADE
RELATIVE TO GERMANY
20.424**
(0.092)
20.391**
(0.093)
20.378**
(0.093)
INDUSTRIAL CORRELATION WITH
GERMANY
22.823
(4.172)
——
MEMBER OF SNAKE OR ERM 20.986
(1.115)
21.549
(0.957)
21.486
(0.950)
CABINET CENTER OF GRAVITY 0.660
(0.675)
——
ELECTION 1.258
(0.897)
1.233
(0.911)
—
PERCENT OF SEATS HELD BY
GOVERNMENT PARTIES
0.042
(0.040)
——
NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT PARTIES 20.379
(0.374)
——
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 23.184
(2.602)
——
CAPITAL CONTROLS 0.951**
(0.260)
1.066**
(0.240)
1.084**
(0.239)
MANUFACTURED EXPORTS TO THE DM
ZONE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
20.289**
(0.147)
20.257**
(0.126)
20.255**
(0.125)
CHANGE IN THE TRADE BALANCE AS A
PERCENTAGE OF GDP
20.740**
(0.248)
20.541**
(0.247)
20.547**
(0.247)
N278 313 313
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses under the coef cients.
*Draws attention to coef cients signi cant at or above the 10% level.
**Draws attention to coef cients signi cant at or above the 5% level.
852 International Organizationments do use a currency peg more than right-wing governments for short-term
purposes; an independent central bank can stabilize the exchange rate in the short
run more effectively than a dependent one, and membership in the snake/EMS
increased national ability to stabilize currencies. Again, note that these variables
reduce short-term volatility but not the propensity to depreciate itself; they also do
not unambiguously support OCA or credibility-based arguments.
The substantive interpretation of most of the coef cients in the regressions is
relatively straightforward. Those having to do with the average annual depreciation
TABLE 5. Determinants of European currency variability.
Dependent variable 5 coef cient of variation
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 2.628**
(1.052)
2.334**
(0.755)
2.304**
(0.767)
LAGGED GROWTH RATE OF GDP 20.121**
(0.055)
20.107**
(0.054)
20.112**
(0.052)
LAGGED UNEMPLOYMENT 20.011
(0.031)
——
LAGGED CURRENT ACCOUNT AS A
PERCENTAGE OF GDP
20.077
(0.052)
20.110**
(0.051)
20.118**
(0.051)
DIFFERENCE IN THE TERMS OF TRADE
RELATIVE TO GERMANY
20.044*
(0.025)
20.027
(0.025)
—
INDUSTRIAL CORRELATION WITH GERMANY 0.278
(1.189)
——
MEMBER OF SNAKE OR ERM 21.060**
(0.306)
21.103**
(0.260)
21.077**
(0.266)
CABINET CENTER OF GRAVITY 0.473**
(0.186)
0.498**
(0.182)
0.516**
(0.183)
ELECTION 0.269
(0.225)
——
PERCENT OF SEATS HELD BY GOVERNMENT
PARTIES
0.002
(0.012)
——
NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT PARTIES 20.081
(0.102)
——
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 22.730**
(0.765)
22.427**
(0.784)
22.567**
(0.777)
CAPITAL CONTROLS 0.100
(0.073)
0.144**
(0.068)
0.139**
(0.069)
MANUFACTURING EXPORTS TO THE DM ZONE
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
20.145**
(0.040)
20.136**
(0.032)
20.130**
(0.033)
CHANGE IN THE TRADE BALANCE AS A
PERCENTAGE OF GDP
20.188**
(0.067)
20.144**
(0.065)
20.149**
(0.064)
N278 305 312
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses under the coef cients.
*Draws attention to coef cients signi cant at or above the 10% level.
**Draws attention to coef cients signi cant at or above the 5% level.
Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 853rate are easier to interpret than the coef cient of variation. Looking at Table 4,
column 3, the variables expressed as percentage points (of GDP or as rates of
change) are easily understood. One percentage point improvements in the GDP
growth rate, current account as a share of GDP, and terms of trade relative to
Germany are associated with 0.672, 0.394, and 0.378 percentage point reductions,
respectively, in the currency’s annual depreciation rate against the DM. Similarly,
a one percentage point increase in manufactured exports to the DM zone as a share
of GDP and a one percentage point improvement in the trade balance is associated
with 0.255 and 0.547 percentage point reductions, respectively, in the rate of
depreciation. These are all quite appreciable numbers.
Increasing capital controls by one point on the  fteen-point scale leads to an
increase in the depreciation rate of 1.084 percent. This means little in and of itself;
one way of seeing it is that a three-point difference, roughly equivalent to that
between Norway and Greece, increases the depreciation rate by 3.252 percent a
year.
The impact of explanatory variables on the coef cient of variation cannot be
assessed so directly. A sense of their importance can be seen in the effect of a one
standard deviation change in explanatory variables (holding all others at their
means) on the volatility measure. By this measure, for example, a one standard
deviation increase in the lagged GDP growth rate or the lagged current account is
associated with a reduction in the coef cient of variation of 11.7 and 16.3 percent,
respectively. An increase of one standard deviation in manufactured exports to the
DM zone or the trade balance leads to 17.1 and 14.1 percent reductions in volatility,
while such an increase in central bank independence is associated with a 15.1
percent decline in the coef cient of variation. On the other hand, one standard
deviation’s move to the right of the cabinet center of gravity, or increase in capital
controls, is associated with 13.6 and 14.8 percent increases, respectively, in
volatility.
These results are not generally supportive of credibility-oriented or OCA expla-
nations of European currency policies. Only one signi cant result goes in the
direction expected by an argument based on the credibility-enhancing effects of a
 xed exchange rate: Left governments have less volatile exchange rates in the short
run. But this applies only to month-to-month volatility, not to the overall longer-
term stance of currency policy. It is extremely weak evidence, especially as the
central bank independence variable is just as strongly signi cant, but in the opposite
direction. To be sure, the dif culty of measuring the demand for anti-in ationary
credibility implies that this evidence is not de nitive. Nonetheless, while credibility
motivations cannot be excluded, it is dif cult to see any support for them in this
analysis. Also, the data used here are not well suited to the assessment of the impact
of elections on policy because each observation is a calendar year. Analyses of the
data using a hazard model yield generally ambiguous results, although there is some
mild evidence of an electoral exchange-rate cycle, in which politicians delay
devaluations until after elections. This evidence is at best tentative, however.
854 International OrganizationThe principal results reported here are quite robust. Removing outliers—the
Netherlands and Austria on one end, Greece and Portugal on the other—leaves the
results essentially intact. This does reduce the signi cance of a few variables, which
is not surprising, as it involves removing nearly one-third of all observations, but the
major explanatory variables remain signi cant. When countries are omitted one by
one, results are undisturbed. Adding year  xed effects only strengthens the results;
adding country  xed effects has little impact, although (not surprisingly) it reduces
the size of some coef cients.
Many versions of the empirical models were assessed, with no impact on the
principal results, those pertaining to the proxies for real sectoral considerations.
Manufactured exports to the EU as a whole (not just to the DM bloc) gives
essentially identical results. Inclusion of the  scal de cit (lagged or simultaneous)
serves to make most other variables more signi cant and their coef cients larger.
34
The  scal de cit is itself signi cant and associated with more depreciation. Some
scholars suggest a relationship between union density and better macroeconomic
outcomes.
35 Data on union membership as share of the labor force, however, are
unavailable for Ireland, Spain, and Portugal, and unavailable elsewhere after 1989
or 1990. In any event, when these data are included (with almost half the
observations lost) the variable is not signi cant and does not change the other
variables in appreciable ways. Alternative proxies for credibility factors are hard to
identify. When past in ation is included—in the form of a three-year moving
average of the Consumer Price Index, lagged one year—it is associated with
depreciation and volatility, running directly against the expected credibility argu-
ment, although this result is not statistically signi cant (and does not affect the
impact of the principal explanatory variables). Such a  nding is not particularly
surprising, as discussed previously: currencies from countries with high in ation
typically depreciate against other currencies. In other words, the direct impact of
high in ation on the exchange rate dominates whatever effect it might have on the
demand for credibility. In any case, the principal results support a high degree of
con dence—especially concerning the two proxies for private-sector interests and
the macroeconomic controls.
The results are summarized as follows:
1. Proxies for private-sector interests were signi cant and important. They
were consistent with the argument that regionally oriented producers prefer
a  xed currency, while import- and export-competers prefer  exibility. In
other words, real factors were crucial. The more important manufactured
exports to the DM zone (Germany and Benelux) were, the slower the de-
preciation rate and the less volatile the currency; an increase in net import
34. Not surprisingly, it does make the current account insigni cant; it also makes central bank
independence signi cant (but, again, not in the direction anticipated by credibility-based accounts).
35. Calmfors and Dri ll 1988.
Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 855competition, controlling for the current account, increased the depreciation
rate and volatility signi cantly.
2. Macroeconomic control variables all had the expected effects. Such funda-
mentals as the current account balance, GDP growth, and the terms of trade
relative to the anchor country all reduced the depreciation rate and currency
volatility substantially.
3. Variables intended to capture inclinations to  x currencies to gain anti-
in ationary credibility were almost never signi cant. The only exception
was that left-wing parties were more likely to hold the currency stable in
the short run; there was no partisan difference in depreciation rates. A mea-
sure of suitability for membership in an OCA was never signi cant.
The results are in line with my expectations about the role of private interests. The
level of commercial integration with Germany led to a more  xed exchange
rate;increases in net import competition spurred depreciation. These two results
provide a rough evaluation of the impact of private distributional interests—in
the event of exporters of complex manufactures and of import-competers—on
exchange-rate policy.
Conclusions
This study con rms the importance of real factors, and sectoral interests, in the
development of European monetary integration. Higher levels of manufactured
exports to Germany and Benelux and improvements in the trade balance are both
associated with more  xed exchange rates against the DM. The empirical analysis
also con rms the importance of macroeconomic conditions. I do not  nd apprecia-
ble support for arguments based on the alleged credibility-enhancing properties of
currency pegs nor those based on OCA criteria.
The results show that distributionally motivated private interests, driven by the
real effects of currency policy on trade and investment, are relevant to the making
of exchange-rate policy. Speci cally, exporters of sophisticated manufactures and
cross-border investors seem to support stable exchange rates, while import- and
export-competers favor depreciation. There is little or no evidence of the use of the
exchange rate as a commitment mechanism for governments without anti-in ation-
ary credibility or of the relevance of OCA considerations to exchange-rate policy
choice. Those attempting to explain currency arrangements in Europe and else-
where—most notably dollarization in Latin America and Euroization in Central and
Eastern Europe—would be wise to consider the potential importance of such
distributional consderations for the future of national exchange-rate policies.
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De nition and Sources of Explanatory Variables
LAGGED GROWTH RATE OF GDP. Growth rate of GDP, lagged one year. Data for 1971–79
from United Nations 1985; for 1980–93 from OECD 1994.
LAGGED UNEMPLOYMENT. Percentage of the labor force unemployed, lagged one year. Data
from OECD 1993, 1995, 1980; and United Nations 1985.
LAGGED CURRENT ACCOUNT AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP. Current account balance as a
percentage of GDP, lagged one year. Data from OECD various years (a).
DIFFERENCE IN TERMS OF TRADE RELATIVE TO GERMANY. Percentage point change in the
terms of trade over the previous year, relative to Germany’s terms of trade. An increase in this
 gure signi es a deterioration in Germany’s terms of trade relative to the country in question.
Data from IMF 1996.
INDUSTRIAL CORRELATION WITH GERMANY. Correlation coef cient comparing the percent
contribution to GDP of each ISIC one-digit category and two-digit categories for manufac-
turing (ISIC code 3). Because industrial structure changes slowly, the correlation coef cient
is calculated for 1970, 1980, and 1990 only. Data from OECD various years (b). Where data
were missing from the OECD statistics, data were taken from the United Nations various
years (a).
MEMBER OF SNAKE OR ERM. Dichotomous variable 5 1 if country is a member of either
snake or ERM, zero if not. Data obtained from BIS various years.
CABINET CENTER OF GRAVITY. Party composition of the cabinet, weighted by ideological
scores using a scale constructed by Geoffrey Garrett. Data through 1991 provided by
Geoffrey Garrett; updated using Mu ¨ller 1994 and 1995; Sundberg 1993; and EJPR various
years.
ELECTION. Number of elections per year (usually 1 or zero). Data obtained from Mackie
and Rose 1991; Mu ¨ller 1995 and 1994; Sundberg 1993; and EJPR various years.
PERCENTAGE OF SEATS HELD BY GOVERNMENT PARTIES. Percentage of legislative seats won
by the government parties in the election at time t, where t denotes the current observation.
Constructed in Powell and Whitten 1993; updated using EJPR various years.
NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT PARTIES. Number of parties in government. Constructed in
Powell and Whitten 1993; updated using EJPR various years.
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE. An index of central bank independence, running from zero
(least independent) to 1 (most independent). Data from Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992.
Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration 857CAPITAL CONTROLS. A measure of capital controls constructed by Dennis Quinn, described
in Quinn 1997. His 15 point-scale measures “openness;” it is inverted here so that a higher
number means more capital controls. Data obtained from the author.
MANUFACTURED EXPORTS TO DM ZONE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP. Value of manufactured
(SITC codes 6-8) exports to Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands as a
percentage of GDP. Data from United Nations various years (b).
CHANGE IN TRADE BALANCE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP. Change in the trade balance from
the previous year, in percentage terms. Constructed from data for trade balance and GDP and
IMF various years.
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